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TRANSLATION 
 
Machiavelli Facing the Challenge of Gouvernementalité1 
Michel Senellart, École Normale Supérieure de Lyon 
 
For Michel Foucault, Machiavelli cannot be taken for the father of historico-political discourse, 
deciphering the signs of a permanent civil war in the political order and analyzing the rela-
tions of power as the relations of war, because he considers only the relation of force from the 
viewpoint of the strategy of the prince and not as a field, immanent to society and within 
which the relation of power takes place.2  Further, he does not analyze it in the element of his-
tory, this being for him only, “a collection of jurisprudence or of tactical models.”3  But, ac-
cording to a more frequent representation, he also could not be any more considered the 
premier modern theorist of the art of governing established in the 16th century under the name 
of raison d’état, not because the first theorists of raison d’état for the most part criticize him se-
verely, but because their problem would be entirely other than the one pursued by Machiavel-
li: the conservation of the state itself and not the reinforcement of “the relation of the prince to 
that over which he exercises his domination,” that is to say, the territory and its population.4  
In fact, the problem of Machiavelli, would be the resumption of a “juridical principle by which 
one defined sovereignty in public law, from the Middle Ages to the 16th century,” sovereignty 
being understood here as a power exercised essentially over a territory.5 
In this manner, and despite the change of problematic which emerges in the passage of 
the course from 1976 to that of 1978 – the replacement of the model of war (or of the ‘perpetual 
battle’) as a paradigm for analyzing power relations by that of government as an art of “con-
                                                 
1 This article was first published as ”Machiavel à l’épreuve de la gouvernementalité” in L’Enjeu Machiavel, edited 
by Gérald Sfez and Michel Senellart (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001), 211-227.  The article is 
translated for Foucault Studies by Seán Erwin, Barry University (Miami Shores). 
2 Cf. Foucault, Il faut défendre la société (course at the Collège de France, 1976, henceforth cited IDS) (Paris: 
Gallimard – Le Seuil, Hautes Études, 1997), 145. 
3 Ibid., 150-151. 
4 Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population (course at the Collège de France, 1978, henceforth cited STP) (Paris: 
Gallimard, Le Seuil, Hautes Études, 2004), 248. 
5 Ibid., published in, Foucault, Dits et écrits (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque des sciences humaines, 1994) (hence-
forth, DE), t. III, 643.  
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ducting conduct”6—Machiavelli is in each case dislodged from the founding position, placed 
in rupture with the entire juridical-political tradition commonly attributed to him.  The com-
mon point for these two rejections (both from the point of view of war as well as that of gov-
ernment) resides in the fact that Machiavelli remains trapped in the, “circle of sovereignty in 
relationship to itself”: 
 
(…) the end of sovereignty is circular: it returns to the very exercise of sovereignty; the good 
is defined as obedience to the law; therefore the good that sovereignty proposes is that the 
people obey it.  It is an essential circularity which, whatever the theoretical structure may 
evidently be, the moral justification or the practical effects, is not so far from that which 
Machiavelli stated when he declared that the principal objective of the Prince must be to 
maintain his principality.7     
 
In other terms, Machiavelli would not be the one who overturned the former juridical concep-
tion of monarchy substituting for it techniques of power written in the immanence of relations 
of force.  Even if he affirms that the law cannot be sufficient to itself and that it often requires 
assistance from violence and deception in order to attain its objectives—these manners of 
combat “proper to beasts”8—thereby shifting the center of gravity from the legality to the 
competence of the prince, it is for Foucault within the juridical model defined by the sover-
eign-territory relation that Machiavelli would abolish the normative division between the legal 
and the non-legal. 
 
 (…) far from thinking that Machiavelli paves the way to modern political thought, I would 
say, on the contrary, that he marks the end of an age, or in any case that he (…) marks the 
culmination of a moment in which the problem was really the one of the safety of the prince 
and of his territory.9 
 
This paradoxical interpretation appears to me both very deceiving and stimulating.  It is de-
ceiving, first, by the narrowness of its perspective, the schematism of its arguments, the flat-
ness that it imposes on the Machiavellian text which conceals all of its complexity—which is, 
precisely, that it does not lead back to a unique principle but functions as an open structure, 
fluid and de-centered.  In effect, it would be easy to oppose to it a number of major objections.   
How does one reduce the thought of Machiavelli to the sole problematic of the Prince without 
even posing the question of the unity of the work, of the relations between the Prince and the 
Discourses (not to mention other texts), and of the coherence that emerges beyond their appar-
ent contradiction?  How do we sustain the premise that the relation of force is essentially de-
                                                 
6 CF. M. Senellart, “Michel Foucault: gouvernementalité et raison d’État,” La pensée politique, 1 (1993), (Paris: 
Gallimard – Le Seuil, Hautes Études, 276-303) (see especially pages 283-290 on the turning point discussed 
here.) 
7 Foucault, STP, 4th lecture, DE III, 645-646. 
8 Machiavelli, Le Prince, chapter 18, translated by Ch. Bec., in Machiavel, Œuvres complètes, t. 1 (Paris: Garnier, 
1987), 377. 
9 Foucault, STP, 3rd lecture. 
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scribed by Machiavelli as a “political technique in the hands of the sovereign”10 while passing 
over silently the thesis of the division of the humors described in the Prince (chapter 9) as in 
the Discourses (I, 3-8), a division that one knows traverses the social body itself independently 
of regime and determines the form of government (“Of these two appetites born in the cities 
follows one of these three effects: monarchy, liberty or license”)?11  Is there not to be discov-
ered in that the idea of a battle or of a permanent struggle—“confusion,” “disorder,” “tumult,” 
“dangers,” “disunion”—set in the thick of social relations?  Considering for a moment only 
this point of view, does not the competence of the prince consist in managing this social con-
flict, playing the people off against the great, rather than imposing his law on a uniform mass 
of subjects defined by their belonging to a “territory”?12  Is not such a conception of the social 
division and of its socio-political dynamic, generator of both power and stability, radically 
antithetical to the juridical paradigm of sovereignty?  Does it not induce a relation of power to 
society quite foreign to the pure transcendence of the law?  And if the contrary of this juridical 
model resides in the idea (attributed by Foucault to Boulainvilliers) that power is not a proper-
ty but a relation,13 the mixed constitution, transversal to the social division, and praised as it is 
by Machiavelli—does this not offer the best illustration of this idea precisely insofar as it pro-
hibits all appropriation of power by an individual or a group?  Whether the law is the product 
of crime (including the Romuleen murder which Thomas Bern reminded us carried all the 
force of “originarity”14) or of the conflict of the social humors and of the action of necessity 
(crisis, peril, state of emergency), here to me it seems that Machiavelli is situated antithetically 
to the juridical model for which the law always originates in reason (custom, natural or divine 
reason).    
To these objections Foucault would have without doubt responded that he was not 
proposing a comprehensive explanation of Machiavelli’s thought nor seeking to uncover the 
“truth” of the work as it unfolds, more or less erratically, under multiple figures and through 
its various strata.  Nor again did he want to offer a commentary—one among many—of Mach-
iavelli, grasping the diverse moments of the work in the gesture of a unifying synthesis.  To 
this idea of a totalizing, summarizing truth in texts freed from their noisy context and deliv-
ered up for quiet and silent reading, Foucault opposes, if one can say it, the principle of the 
reduction event: the truth is not that which is retrospectively unveiled, when the battles have 
become silent to those who believe they can now take in with one look an entire scene.  Rather, 
it is what is evident and functions as such at a given moment in the confrontation with or in 
the concerted articulation of the discourses.  There is then a “truth” of Machiavelli, distinct 
from the significations of the work that can tie together the commentary and which consists in 
the historic function of Machiavelli.    
                                                 
10 Foucault, IDS, 7th lecture, 145. 
11 Machiavelli, Le Prince, chap. 9, 321. 
12 Foucault briefly makes an allusion to this idea in STP, 10th lecture, concerning the comparison of Bacon and 
Machiavelli. 
13 Foucault, IDS, 8TH Lecture, 150. 
14 Cf. T. Berns, ”L’originaire de la loi chez Machiavel,” in L’enjeu Machiavel (Paris: PUF, Librairie du Collège 
International de Philosophie, 2001), 123-140. 
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However, this historic function should not be confused with the polemic or apologetic 
Machiavellianism of the 16th and 17th centuries, that is to say, with the critical use made in the 
name of Machiavelli and of certain of his theses.  If Machiavelli, for Foucault, remains foreign 
to the new governmental rationality put in place at that time this does not prevent Foucault 
from also recognizing that “he is at the center of the debate”: 
 
He is at the center of a debate during this period between 1580 and 1650-1660 (…), not at all 
because of what he said but where the debate is conducted through him.  This debate does 
not take place because of what he said, and it is not through or in him that an art of govern-
ment will be located.  He did not define an art of government, but an art of government will 
be looked for in what he said.15   
 
Foucault then shows, based on the book of E. Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque 
de Richelieu,16 how the opponents of raison d’état—the “pro-Spanish, anti-Richelieu Catholics” 
—reduce the art of governing to Machiavellianism to oppose it, while certain among the sup-
porters of raison d’état take the defense of Machiavelli (Naudé, Machon) because they see him 
to have been the first to have tried “to identify without any natural model or theological foun-
dation, the necessary relationships between those who govern and those who are governed.”17  
The historical function of Machiavelli which, according to Foucault, demonstrates his 
belonging to the juridical discourse of sovereignty, is not then identical to how the opponents 
and partisans of raison d’état utilized his work in hostile, wary or complicit ways.  Nor does it 
refer to the commentary of the (quasi)-contemporaries who, nearer to the initial context of the 
publication of the texts of Machiavelli, would be more inclined to understand its true spirit.   
There is not more ‘truth” in the manner which these authors, who followed Machiavelli some 
decades later, appropriated his name and his maxims, whether to demonize or seek inspira-
tion in them, than in the modern readings of the work.  To say this in other terms, Machiavel-
lianism does not possess a privileged access to the truth in relation to those readings that claim 
to rediscover the true Machiavelli beyond the distortions that have been imposed on him for 
centuries.  In both cases, one always has to deal with a commentary—whether more or less 
conscientious is not the question—which substitutes its own logic to the event-function of the 
work. 
Therefore, how does one analyze this event-function?  Not by emphasizing the truth 
lodged or hidden in the significations of the text but by attending to that which emerges from 
the relations it maintains with the structural elements of the context in which it is written.   
These elements do not explain it (nor does it explain them itself) but they do define the field of 
intelligibility from which it takes its sense.    
In a very vague and general manner, this context can be characterized by the passage 
from a theological-juridical conception of power centered on the law to a historical-political 
conception centered on the government of things.  Still, this hardly permits us to understand 
                                                 
15 Foucault, STP, 9th Lecture. 
16 Paris, A. Colin, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu [1966]; re-edited [new edition] 
(Paris: Albin Michel, Bibliothèque de L’Évolution de l’Humanité, 2000). 
17 Foucault, STP, 9th Lecture. 
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why Machiavelli would represent “the end of an age” rather than the beginning of modern 
political thought.  It seems to me that this otherwise very classic schema is superimposed in 
Foucault on another, less linear schema, more profound and without doubt more essential in 
his analysis.  This schema does not obey the model of a continuous evolution but rather the 
movement of plate tectonics: a progressive collapsing of the model of the Roman state, surging 
and sliding on the surface of the Christian discourse on government.  Rome, in other words, is 
effaced to the profit of Jerusalem.  But, in its turn, this formula is reductive and misleading, 
since it is not a question here of a Jerusalem in expectation of the end of time, extending to-
ward the supreme and glorious Second Coming—a Jerusalem which is in a certain way noth-
ing other than the Christianized figure of eternal Rome.   Rather, it is a question of a type of 
specific power, born in the Eastern Mediterranean, developed by the Hebrews and experi-
enced within the first Christian communities, this ensemble of techniques and of procedures of 
the government of souls that Foucault terms the pastorate and, according to him, is foreign to 
the Jewish or Greco-Roman principle of the law.18  It is at the level of the game between the 
pastorate and government, and not at the level of a political theology defining the relations of 
the terrestrial city and the celestial city, that the process of Christianization took place, i.e., the 
fact of pastoralization.  This affected Western societies in a way both experimental and local at 
the very beginning of the Middle Ages and then afterwards, starting from the 16th century, in a 
way that was general and systematic.  My proposition here is not to analyze the steps and the 
forms of this process but to simply indicate the reason for which the phenomenon of Chris-
tianization/pastoralization does not at all exclude the acknowledgment of a progressive ‘de-
theologization’ without being simply sacrificed to the ideological scheme of  ‘secularization.’ 
Let us return for a moment to Rome.  The identification of the Middle Ages—this age 
that ignored that it was the Middle Ages, but which also ignored that it was no longer antiqui-
ty19—is a theme already strongly underlined by Foucault in the 1976 course: Society Must Be 
Defended.  Citing the phrase of Petrarch, “Is there nothing more in history than the praise of 
Rome?” he writes that: 
  
Rome was still present, functioning as a sort of permanent and current historical presence in 
the Middle Ages.  Rome was perceived as divided into 1000 canals that traversed Europe 
but all these canals were supposed to be traced back to Rome.20  
 
But this discourse in praise of Rome was none other than the “internal discourse of the state 
on itself” which had the function of exhibiting the right of the state, founding its sovereignty, 
relating its uninterrupted genealogy, and illustrating the correctness of public right by its he-
roes, exploits, dynasties.”21  Beyond the historical analogies and cultural reminiscences, Rome 
therefore represents in the analysis of Foucault the very concept of the juridical model of the 
state, defining power in terms of the sovereign exercise of law over a territory.  The praise of 
Rome from the 16th to the 18th centuries functions as a defense and glorification of public right.   
                                                 
18 Ibid., 8th Lecture. 
19 Foucault, IDS, 4th Lecture, 65. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 7th lecture, 125. 
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It is to this discourse that Foucault in 1976 opposes the radically historicist counter-discourse 
of the war of the races articulated at the time of the Reformation and the English Revolution, 
“on the great biblical form of prophecy and the promise.”22  Jerusalem understood here as the 
figure of opposition and of resistance to royal sovereignty “objected against eternal Rome.”23  
On another level, it is to it that he opposes in 1978 the new governmental reason of the 16th to 
17th centuries that made the techniques inherited from pastoral Christianity function in the 
service of the power of the state.  Whether we are situated within the perspective of the coun-
ter-discourse of the war of the races or of the emergence of modern gouvernementalité, this is an 
entirely new problematic of power that organizes itself through their relationship with one 
another.  The same fact imposes itself forcefully at the turn of the 17th century—the retreat of 
the Roman, juridical-political model.    
In his course of 1978—Security, Territory, Population—Foucault returns repeatedly to 
this effacement of Rome, which manifests under a triple form: 
 
1. The transition from the ancient imperial universalism to the principle of 
competition between and balance among states.    
2. The substitution of a historical-prudential conception of government for that 
of the legal-absolutist conception of the Imperium.    
3. The replacement of the model of conquest that made territory the raw mate-
rial of sovereign power by that of conservation which shifted the center of 
gravity of governmental action to the management of men and of things 
(raw materials, town and country, riches in general, etc.) 
 
If Machiavelli (as someone hardly suspected of attachment to the Empire) acknowledges the 
crisis of political and religious universalism before many others, it is still the case that accord-
ing to the second and third points Foucault would have him belong to the ancient-medieval 
tradition—i.e., the Roman.  Without doubt such an assignment is extremely questionable.   
Does not Foucault in a certain way take literally the principle of the ceaseless imitation of 
Rome invoked by Machiavelli without perceiving that, first, it functions as an instrument of 
critique of the classical and Christian conception of the political before then being turned back 
against a certain humanistic idealization of the Roman model?24  But it doesn’t matter here.  
The fact is that, for Machiavelli, it is Rome rather than Athens, Sparta or Venice, which consti-
tutes the example to follow in the present and justifies a politics of territorial expansion and 
domination.25  Machiavelli marks the “end of an age” which is not, of course, that of medieval 
political theology nor of Italian civic humanism (which Foucault does not address and which 
is external to his problematic).  Rather, it is that of “the praise of Rome” which transverses in a 
certain way these two discourses.  Thus to the phrase of Petrarch this warning from Guic-
                                                 
22 Ibid., 4th Lecture, 63. 
23 Ibid., 62. 
24 Cf. Lefort, Le travail de l’œuvre Machiavel, new edition, “Tel,” (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), 506. 
25 Cf. notably his, Discours sur la première décade de Tite-Live, I, 6. 
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ciardini could be an echo, written obviously for Machiavelli: “How mistaken are those who at 
every word cite the Romans!”26             
As deceiving as it is biased by its simplifying and one-sided schematic, the interpreta-
tion that Foucault proposes of Machiavelli does not end in illuminating a truth of the Machia-
vellian text that could rightfully be challenged on the basis of relevance.  Rather, it refers to a 
deeper and, to his eyes, more essential discursive stratum in order to understand the for-
mation of modern political rationality, which itself plays on the conflict between Rome and 
“Jerusalem.”  The event of the Machiavellian text praised in, The History of Sexuality (“Machia-
velli was one of the rare—and there it was without doubt the scandal of his ‘cynicism’—to 
think the power of the Prince in terms of the relations of force”),27 dissolves or loses in any 
case all foundational or paradigmatic value at this level of analysis.  My proposition in this 
paper is not to examine the usage that Foucault makes of these great historical-typological cat-
egories.  But it is clear that it is at this level, and not solely on the basis of his reading of Mach-
iavelli (obviously very incomplete in Foucault), that one has to position oneself in order to 
evaluate, test and discuss his affirmations.  I will soon furnish an example of this by means of 
the problem of the censure of mores. 
But it seems to me that one can still take a further step, and it is there that the Foucauld-
ian interpretation of the problematic of the Prince, as summary and partial as it is, appears to 
me equally very stimulating.  To narrow the work of Machiavelli to the Prince, and this text to 
the sole question—central, certainly, but linked to an entire network of other themes—of the 
domination by the prince of his acquired or conquered territory, does it not reduce this work 
nearly to the point of pure and simple nonexistence?  Does not Foucault outrageously simplify 
Machiavelli in order to suggest that we almost could well completely do without him?  Is his 
reading not involved in a strategy aiming to make it as if, basically, Machiavelli had not exist-
ed?  It would seem that such a gesture, far from explaining in a certain way the judgment 
passed on Machiavelli, as the critique of the Roman model could do, on the contrary discredits 
it completely.  It is no longer a question here of disputing the originality of Machiavelli—a 
point of view one could argue in different ways—but of reconstituting without him the gene-
sis of modern political thought—a position which is for its part completely unsustainable.       
But this is what Foucault attempts to do while he provocatively affirms that, “there is not an 
art of government in Machiavelli,”28 which is to say that Machiavelli is entirely foreign to the 
history of the art of governing.    
One can of course understand this formula very simply from the distinction between 
the prince and the state.  According to Foucault, Machiavellian techniques pertain to the dom-
inance of the prince, while the art of governance relates to the state as a collective reality.  But 
this opposition is hardly satisfying.  If it is indeed true that the Machiavellian prince did not 
deal with the state in the sense understood by the theoreticians of sovereignty after Bodin, this 
prince is concerned with the stato—his power, his position, the domain over which he exercis-
                                                 
26 Ricordi, CX; French translation by J.-L. Fournel and J.-Cl. Zancarini, Avertissements politiques (Paris: Le Cerf, 
“La nuit surveillée,” 1988), 89.  
27 Foucault, La volonté de savoir (Paris: Gallimard, “Bibliothèque des histoires,” 1976), 128. 
28 Foucault, STP, 9th Lecture. 
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es his domination.29  However, things are much less clear on the side of the theorists of raison 
d’état, i.e., the art of governing the state according to its own ‘reason.’  In effect, these theorists 
do not oppose the government of the prince and the government of the state, but they affirm 
that the reason of the state is inseparably the reason of the prince and of the state: “good reason 
of state,” wrote, for example, Zuccolo in 1621, “aims at the good both of who commands and 
who obeys.”30  On the other hand, the practitioners of raison d’état oppose the prince’s pursuit 
of his own interest at the cost of the public interest.  Only an entirely uncritical reading that, 
without recoiling, conforms to the clichés of anti-Machiavellianism can nonetheless conclude 
that the Machiavellian prince works only in his own interest, outside of all consideration of 
common utility.  The formula of Foucault, “There is not an art of government in Machiavelli,” 
cannot therefore be explained by the distinction prince/State, except by being subject to an 
immediate challenge.  It seems to me that it proceeds not by an assertoric judgment, forthwith 
contradicted by the factual evidence, but by a hypothetical decision: ‘Assuming that Machia-
velli has nothing to do with the formation of the modern art of government, what genealogy 
can one make of it?’  It is an act of force that aims to open up a new field of intelligibility, pre-
viously masked or hidden by the immense figure of Machiavelli: the field of events and of 
concrete practices resulting in the emergence in the 16th and 17th centuries of a new govern-
mental reason.  This difference between Machiavelli and the art of government is what per-
mits the deployment of governmentality. 
I believe this leads us to a fundamental problem.  The apparently off-hand, but strate-
gically calculated, gesture by Foucault towards Machiavelli is, as a matter of fact, the treat-
ment that he applies to universals.  Wishing to show how his approach is far removed from 
any historicist reduction, he explains in the first lesson of the 1979 course, The Birth of Biopoli-
tics, that “historicism starts from the universal and in a certain way passes it through the 
grinder of history,” while its problem is entirely the inverse:  
  
I start from the decision at the same time theoretical and methodological which consists in 
saying: ‘Let us suppose that the universal does not exist’, and at that moment I ask the ques-
tion to history and to the historians: How are you able to write history if you do not admit a 
priori that something like the state, society, the sovereign and subjects exist? (…) Therefore it 
is exactly the inverse of historicism that I would like to put in place.  Not, therefore, ques-
tioning the universals while utilizing history as a critical method, but starting from the deci-
sion that universals do not exist in order to ask what kind of history we can do.31  
                                                 
29  On this important question, cf. in particular F. Chabod, “Alcune questioni di terminologia: Stato, nazione, 
patria nel linguaggio del Cinquecento,” [1957] in Scritti sul Rinascimento (Turin: Einaudi, 1967); J. H. Hexter, “Il 
principe and lo stato,” Studies in the Renaissance, IV (1957), 113-138.   
30 Zuccolo, Della ragione di stato, in B. Croce and S. Caramella, Politici e moralisti del seicento (Bari: G. Laterza & 
figli, 1930), 36. 
31 Foucault, NBP, 1st lecture.  On this nominalist bias, cf. Foucault, La volonté du savoir, 123; the summary of 
the 1979 course (NBP), DE III, 819 (on “the need to test a nominalist method in history” Foucault makes ref-
erence to P. Veyne: cf. regarding this last, P. Veyne, Comment on écrit l’histoire, new edition, P. Veyne, “Points 
Histoire” (Paris: Le Seuil, 1971), 89-93, and P. Veyne, “Foucault révolutionne l’histoire” [1978], ibid., 207-211); P. 
Veyne, “Foucault” in D. Huisman (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes (Paris: PUF, 1984), 943 (included in DE, 
IV, 634: “Un scepticisme systématique à l’égard de tous les universaux anthropologiques.”)  
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Applied to Machiavelli, this method can be translated thus: let us suppose that Machiavelli is 
not so important, so central, so new as we commonly say, how do we account for the appear-
ance, at the turn of the classical age, of a new art of governance?  It allows Foucault to differen-
tiate himself on two fronts: on the one side, that of the idealist historicism of Meinecke who 
authored the great book, L’idée de la raison d’État dans l’histoire des Temps modernes (1924),32 
which remained until recent decades the reference work on the subject.33  And, on the other 
side, that of political philosophy.  Despite all that separates them, both have in common the 
substantializing of Machiavelli into a figure of a beginning without antecedent.  Machiavelli in 
that way functions like a quasi-universal in that he incarnates, according to Meinecke, the idea 
of raison d’état as a living force of the singular against the syntheses of abstract universalism or, 
found in a number of other interpreters, as the sudden radical and irreversible rupture with 
classical political thought by which at a blow reveals the effective truth of the state.  Placing 
this quasi-universal between parentheses is thus, for Foucault, the means of opening up for 
analysis the space of governmental practices, establishing new continuities, marking new 
thresholds of rupture between Antiquity, the Middle Ages and modern times, making appear 
new articulations between the religious and the political along with new genealogical axes and 
new configurations of power (the solidarity of raison d’état and the police state on the horizon 
of modern bio-power), etc.  One can hesitate in entirely following Foucault on this terrain and 
challenge his hypotheses or his conclusions, but perhaps such an approach is the occasion for 
questioning from the outside the problematic, if not paradoxical, link which unites Machiavelli 
to philosophy, of reinserting him in the long, little known, history of governmental practices, 
and of re-evaluating his contribution without denying the driving and provocative force of his 
genius in the light of this discursive field.    
Besides, as I stated earlier, the Foucauldian genealogy of gouvernementalité should itself 
be put to the test of historical analysis.  I would like simply to give an example of it, regarding 
the conflict between Rome and Jerusalem, by drawing on the question of “censure” as devel-
oped by one of the first German theorists of the Policey, George Orbrecht, at the beginning of 
the 17th century.  This will lead me, in conclusion, to emphasize another limit to the model 
proposed by Foucault and to highlight, by without doubt an unusual detour, the timeliness of 
Machiavellian virtù.    
Obrecht34 is considered one of the principal 17th century theorists of the Policey, the en-
semble of regulatory mechanisms that aimed at reinforcing the power of the state through the 
                                                 
32 French translation of M. Chevalier (Genève, Droz, 1973). 
33 For a critical re-evalaution of this work, cf. M. Stolleis, “L’idée de la raison d’État de F. Meinecke et la recherche 
actuelle” [1981], French translation by M. Senellart in Y. Zarka (eds.), Raison et déraison d’État (Paris: PUF, 
“Philosophies,” 1989), 6-10, and M. Senellart, “La raison d’État antimachiavélienne” in Ch. Lazzeri and D. Reynié 
(eds.), La raison d’État: politique et rationalité (Paris: PUF, “Recherches politiques,” 1992), 18-20.  
34 Born in Stasbourg in 1547, George Obrecht studied law at Tübingen, then at Besançon, Dôle, Bourges, and 
Orléans.  Formed in the school of French humanistic jurisprudence, St Barthélemy forced him to return to 
Strasbourg where he taught law from 1575 until his death in 1612.  Made rector of the academy in 1595, he 
was knighted in 1604, receiving the title of Count Palatine in 1609.  About this author, cf. the fundamen-
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growth of the common welfare (Wohlfarth) and which constituted, until the century of the En-
lightenment (and no doubt beyond), one of the major axes of modern political rationality.   
More precisely, while a function of the Policey until the end of the 16th century involves assur-
ing the good order of the community in accordance with the principles of divine and human 
justice, it is Obrecht who, in his Secreta politica (1617),35 for the first time defines it in terms of 
state intervention, rational calculation, and permanent discipline in the public interest.  Thus, 
Obrecht broke with the ethical-religious conception of the good police force in order to substi-
tute the program of an administrative technique of social control having as its goal maximiz-
ing the financial resources of the state.   He would be, in effect, the Machiavelli of the Policey. 
The work aims at a two-fold objective.  The first is to ensure, “the establishment, the 
conservation and the growth” of a good Policey where this designates both the body politic in 
its organic structure and the collection of laws and regulations that assure its cohesion.  The 
second is to increase the annual revenues of the prince by just and legal means.  Police and 
taxation are thus in a condition of solidarity with one another, good order creating the condi-
tions of a maximum levy, one that is fair and without violence, while it also makes possible the 
strengthening of collective security.  The police have a fiscal end while taxation has the aim of 
strengthening the police: the common good thus coincides with the good state of public fi-
nances.    
Obrecht understood that the best fiscal technique could not succeed if it did not rest on 
the activity and savings of the prince’s subjects.  But the subjects, in the absence of adequate 
regulation, would be far from dedicated to earn the most possible to give the prince what was 
needed, whether for his ordinary or for his extraordinary revenues, and would waste their 
forces and their resources indulging in revelry, drunkenness, laziness, ostentation, gambling, 
idleness.  This is why he conceived a regulation of the police (Policey Ordnung) that allowed for 
the set up in the principalities, counties, and seigneuries the same perfect police (vollkommen 
unnd perfecte Policey) as that which reigned once in the republic of the Romans.  This police 
was based on the census and the censura.  The institution of the census, subsumed in the cen-
sura, was at the heart of the republican system, as much by its procedure (solemn convocation 
of the citizens every five years, obligatory presence of each citizen, declaration by each one of 
his name and his property, inscription in the registers submitted to the censors for assessment) 
as by its ends: not only the simple counting of men nor just the valuation of assets but also the 
“classification of citizens into a certain number of categories (…) in order to determine their 
different degrees of participation in the collective life” by the definition of their military and 
fiscal obligations together with their political privileges.  The census was, therefore, the mech-
anism by which the republic regulated civic life according to a principle of proportional equal-
ity, founded on the dual criterion of goods and of mores.  All historians confirm it: the Ro-
                                                                                                                                                                  
tal/seminal work of H. Maier, Die ältere deutsche Staats- und Verwaltungslehre [1966], 2nd edition, revised and 
expanded (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1980, new edition, DTV, 1986), 122-131. 
35 Fünff Unterschiedliche Secreta Politica von Anstellung, Erhaltung und Vermehrung guter Policey und von billicher, 
rechtmäßiger und nothwendiger Erhöhung eines jeden Regenten jährlichen Gefällen und Einkommen.  The first post-
humous edition of 1617 was completed in secret by Obrecht’s son at his own expense.  The second edition 
(Strasbourg, 1644, by the presses of Lazare Zetzner) when published (“nunmehr zu männigliches nutzen 
publicirt”) realized a great distribution.  
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mans, as long as they applied them, knew happiness and prosperity, and they fell into deca-
dence as soon as they began to neglect them.  The census and the censura are therefore the form 
that the police should take in imitation of the ancients in order to establish good mores for the 
public, the discipline of the mores being the condition of an efficient tax system. 
Without doubt, writes Obrecht, such an arrangement functions already in the majority 
of states but not in the right way.  If it is preferable not to modify the census, which assesses 
the contributions due from subjects, it is important, on the other hand, to reform profoundly 
the censura.  This is carried out in two ways: either by the institution of special functionaries 
(Deputaten), responsible for overseeing the conduct of subjects, monitoring it, investigating 
and correcting it in case of need by warning and reprimand, or by the application of penal 
sanctions.  The first—the generalis cura et inspectio—plays an essentially preventative role, 
while the second, the responsibility of the courts, a repressive role.   But the first, says Obrecht, 
is entirely unknown today.  No one thinks to implement a preventative police, so that the sub-
jects, punished for their misconduct, do not become better.  This should be, however, the ob-
jective of a true Policey: to form virtuous subjects so that they behave in an honorable and 
Christian manner.  In other words, for Obrecht, to form them in accordance with the discipline 
that God demands of all men as this is conceived by the prince.   And he advocates the regular 
holding of registrations, assigned to the Desputaten, that individualizes the different categories 
of subjects and provides precise statistical data to the authority that needs it.    
Therefore it is here, with this power-knowledge apparatus, in the heart of the pastoral 
model described by Foucault.  Each individual is followed at the different steps of his life by 
the procedure of registration which permits at the same time to know who he is, what is be-
coming of him, how he behaves and what he owes to the state: continuous monitoring (from 
birth to death), generalized (all subjects are submitted to it) and exhaustive (it covers all as-
pects of existence, social and private). 
The reference of Obrecht to the Roman model, though, requires that we revise the 
schema of interpretation proposed by Foucault.  The hypothesis of “gouvernementalité” in effect 
supposes: 1) that the Christian pastorate marks a rupture with the ancient conception of gov-
ernment and invents a new technology of individualizing government, non violent but firmly 
directive; 2) that this pastoral technique, limited in the Middle Ages to very restricted spaces, 
was heavily reinvested starting from the sixteenth century in a governmental practice aimed at 
strengthening obedience and therefore to increasing the power of the state.  The “gouvernemen-
talité” of the classical age would thereby be the heir of the Christian pastoral and not the poli-
tics of the ancients.  In other word, the ‘police’ would not be based on the imitation of the polis 
but on the resumption of the pastoral for secular ends.  But what do we see there?  It is in the 
aftermath of the Peasant’s War (1525) in Germany where the need is expressed for disciplining 
in an authoritarian way.  Maybe this is the moment where one sees, in the clearest and sharp-
est way, pastoral care being transferred from the religious to the political sphere.  What model 
is then being invoked?36  The one of “censure,” which was at the very heart of the socio-
                                                 
36 Cf. H. Maier, 107, concerning Oldenburg’s book, Van radtslagende (1530), one of the earliest treatises devot-
ed to the gute Polizei.   
Senellart: Machiavelli Facing the Challenge of Gouvernementalité 
115 
 
institutional functioning of the Roman republic.  It does not seem that the hypothesis at work 
in the problematic of gouvernementalité can account for this “return to the Romans.”   
Machiavelli himself affirms it in his Discourses: “[The creation of the censors] was one of 
the measures which aided Rome to maintain its freedom in the time that it lived in liberty.   
Having become the arbiters of Roman mores, they were a powerful cause that slowed down 
Roman corruption.”37 Censure is not the power of the force that constrains nor of the will 
which obliges, but that of the gaze which registers, distinguishes, classes, monitors, repri-
mands and judges.  It is a power separate from that of violence and the law and which consists 
in the discipline of the mores.  From Machiavelli to Rousseau, this discipline maintains a close 
relationship with civic virtue, liberty, obedience and happiness.  Its analysis is also an essential 
element of the debate which opposes, in our culture, the liberty of the ancients and the liberty 
of the moderns, or that which the Anglo-Saxons since Isaiah Berlin prefer to call positive liber-
ty and negative liberty.  The question of censure thus returns to the problem of the formation 
of a civic ethos, i.e., of an ethos of liberty.  Such an ethic remains unthinkable in the problematic 
of gouvernementalité, which only conceives liberty under the form of counter conducts (collec-
tive insurrection or individual resistance).  Regardless of how Machiavelli—beyond the insti-
tution of the censure—analyzes the formation of this ethos, while articulating positive and 
negative liberty starting from the division of the humors, he remains, for having put it at the 
center of his political thought, irreducible to the schema of gouvernementalité.   
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37 Machiavelli, Discours sur la première decade de Tite-Live, I (Paris: Laffont, 1996), 49, translated by Ch. Bec, 
271.  Cf. also, but in a quite different spirit, J.-J. Rousseau, Du contrat social, IV, 7: “De la censure” (Paris: Vrin, 
2012).  The forgetting of the problem of censure constitutes the blind point of contemporary anglo-saxon 
republicanism.  To take a good example here, the term does not appear anywhere in M. Viroli’s book, From 
Politics to Reason of State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ideas in Context, 1992), which seems to 
believe that the law only produces virtue, just laws making good citizens.  In the school of the Romans, 
Machiavelli knows that to leggi must be added ordini.  Censure forms part of these ordini.         
